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Hate Is Enough 
HOW NEW YORK’S BIAS CRIMES STATUTE HAS 
EXCEEDED ITS INTENDED SCOPE 
INTRODUCTION 
On the night of Oct. 8, 2006, twenty-eight-year-old 
Michael Sandy drove from his home in the Williamsburg 
section of Brooklyn to a quiet stretch of beach near the Belt 
Parkway.1 Sandy, a designer for a Long Island IKEA furniture 
store, believed he was headed for a late night tryst with a man 
he had met a short time earlier in an internet chat room.2 
Instead, Sandy was set upon by a four teens who had 
orchestrated the rendezvous in order to rob him.3 
But the attackers’ scheme unraveled quickly. Instead of 
handing over his cash, Sandy fled, and the young men pursued 
him onto the Belt Parkway.4 Sandy was struck by a car, 
suffering injuries that put him in a coma and eventually killed 
him.5 Three of the teens, John Fox, 19, Ilya Shurov, 20, and 
Anthony Fortunato, 20, were charged with felony-murder as a 
hate crime.6 A fourth, Gary Timmins, 16, would plead guilty to 
attempted robbery as a hate crime in exchange for his 
testimony against the others.7 
The hate crime statute used against the four defendants 
in Fox was not new. With the passage of the Hate Crimes Act of 
2000,8 New York State joined the growing number of states 
with criminal statutes designed to deter and punish crimes 
  
 1 Jamie Schram, John Doyle & Dan Mangan, Gay ‘Bias’ Victim Clinging to 
Life—May Have Brain Injuries from Mugging and Hit-Run, N.Y. POST, Oct. 10, 2006, at 17. 
 2 See People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff’d on other 
grounds sub nom. People v. Fortunato, 903 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 2010). 
 3 Id. at 631-32. 
 4 Id. at 632. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Alex Ginsberg & Larry Celona, ‘Hate’ Gets Redefined in Gay Slay, N.Y. 
POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at 6. 
 7 See Inmate Information, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, 
http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
 8 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 485.00-485.10 (Consol. 2010). 
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motivated by bias.9 The statute increases penalties for certain 
enumerated crimes in situations where the victim is selected or 
the crime is committed based upon a belief or perception 
regarding age, sex, race, national origin, sexual orientation, or 
a host of other listed characteristics.10 The effect of a conviction 
for an enumerated crime, plus the hate-crime element, is to 
increase the sentencing parameters for the base offense, 
generally by one sentencing class level.11 The difference can be 
significant. An assault resulting in serious physical injury, 
normally a “D” felony, punishable by no more than 7 years in 
prison, becomes a “C” felony, punishable by up 15 years.12  
As the Sandy case progressed, details emerged that 
underscored the tension between the statute’s language and its 
legislative intent. Perhaps most surprising, defendant 
Fortunato pursued a trial defense that included evidence that 
he himself was homosexual.13 Accordingly, the picture of the 
defendants, as a group, that slowly took shape was not that of a 
quartet of vitriolic gay-bashers overcome by animus, but rather 
of four extraordinarily cold and calculating thieves looking for 
easy money to buy drugs.14 Because this picture did not fit the 
stereotypical “hate crime” pattern, the defendants made a 
pretrial motion for dismissal based on the argument that the 
hate crime statute could not be applied to a case where no 
actual “hate” was alleged.15 
The Sandy defendants were attempting to draw the 
court’s attention to a subtle distinction in hate crime law—that 
between “pure hate” crimes and “opportunistic bias” crimes. The 
first type needs little explanation; these are offenses involving 
  
 9 See, e.g., Bane Act sec. 7, § 422.75, 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 607; Act of Apr. 21, 
1988, sec. 4, § 939.645, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 348. 
 10 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1).  
 11 Id. § 485.10(2). Criminal offenses in New York State are categorized by 
offense levels designated by a letter of the alphabet that corresponds to a particular 
range of penalties. Id. § 70.00(2). 
 12 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05, 70.00. 
 13 John Marzulli, ‘I Was Leading Double Lives,’ Says Brooklyn Slay Suspect, 
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 2, 2007, at 14. The evidence was adduced for the purpose of 
arguing to the jury that Fortunato could not have “hated” Sandy, despite the fact that 
the statute has no such requirement. Id. 
 14 John Marzulli, Gays ‘Easy to Get’—Bias Slay Suspect, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), 
Sept. 26, 2007, at 19 (“And he [Fortunato] was telling us how like it’s easy to get them 
once you talk to them. . . . They’ll come and meet you, and we were gonna do it for the 
money.”). 
 15 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Hate Crime Charges, at 1-2, People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 
2007) (No. 8607/06). 
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palpable and virulent animus towards a particular group or 
demographic. Crimes of the second kind, on the other hand, are 
not motivated by any negative feelings towards the group or 
demographic, but nonetheless constitute offenses that fit some 
statutory definitions of hate or bias crimes. Generally, these 
offenses are motivated by a perception regarding the victim’s 
group that leads the perpetrator to believe that the particular 
victim is an easy or convenient target for the crime. Examples 
might include muggers who believe that women are less likely to 
fight back than men, or burglars who believe that South Asians 
keep large amounts of cash and jewelry in their homes. In each 
case, the perpetrator demonstrates no hate towards the group; 
he might in fact conceivably be a member of the group.16 
At first blush, New York State’s Hate Crimes Act 
appears unconcerned with this distinction. It does not require 
that the defendant be motivated by “hate” or “animus” as those 
terms are commonly understood. The law asks only that 
prosecutors prove that the defendant intentionally selected the 
victim or committed the crime “because of a belief or perception 
regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, 
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation 
of a person.”17 That language is sufficiently broad to include two 
interpretations of the events in Fox: that the defendants 
targeted Sandy because they hated gays, or, alternatively, that 
they singled him out based on the belief that he would not 
resist or report the crime. Accordingly, the trial court denied 
the Sandy defendants’ motion to dismiss the hate crime 
charges.18 The decision was sound, at least insofar as the 
language of the statute was so clear as to leave no opportunity 
for an exploration of legislative intent.19 
This note argues that the legislators who enacted the 
Hate Crimes Act had no affirmative intent to include crimes of 
opportunistic bias within its scope. The primary evil against 
which its drafters hoped to strike a blow was traditional, “pure 
hate” bias crimes. Nevertheless, it has been applied to fact 
patterns well outside the traditional “pure hate” scenario; the Fox 
case is both the most newsworthy and most dramatic example. As 
  
 16 For an in-depth discussion of the distinction, and why opportunistic bias 
crimes should be punished as forcefully as traditional hate crimes, see Lu-in Wang, 
Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399 (2000). 
 17 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05. 
 18 Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 635. 
 19 Id. at 634. 
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a result, the Hate Crimes Act confers on prosecutors strong power 
to punish a wider array of offenses than intended, grants 
unnecessary license to law enforcement, threatens the legislature’s 
primacy as the state’s law-creating body and leads to unequal 
application of those laws across jurisdictions. 
Part I begins with a brief history of bias crimes statutes 
in general and a review of the unsuccessful challenges to them. 
Part II examines the New York statute in detail, including the 
legislative intent as evidenced through legislative materials, 
public statements, and news reports. Part III provides an 
expansive review of New York cases in which the law appears 
to have been applied to fact patterns outside the scope of this 
discerned intent. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion 
of the problems created by the Hate Crimes Act, and argues 
that the best solution to these problems is for the legislature to 
change the language of the statute. 
There is certainly room for reasonable people to disagree 
about the proper scope of a hate crime statute and whether it 
should embrace crimes of opportunity in addition to crimes of 
pure hate. Nevertheless, this note is not concerned with such 
normative questions. This note seeks only to determine whether 
the scope of the law, as it is currently understood, is consistent 
with the understanding of the drafters in 2000. 
I.  HATE CRIME LAWS  
This section will provide a brief overview of hate crime 
and bias crime laws in the United States, beginning with the 
first statutes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It will outline 
the most common challenges—legal and nonlegal—such laws 
have faced and will conclude with an analysis of the most 
common forms drafters employ in making these statutes part of 
their jurisdiction’s code. 
A. History of Hate Crime Statutes 
The hate crime statutes now on the books in nearly every 
U.S. jurisdiction are largely creations of the last twenty-five 
years.20 The first city to have devoted a specific unit in its police 
department to investigating bias-related crimes was Boston, 
which in 1978 was struggling with unrest resulting from court-
  
 20 JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND 
IDENTITY POLITICS 3 (1998). 
2011] HATE IS ENOUGH 1603 
ordered desegregation of its public schools.21 The following year, 
Massachusetts enacted a statewide civil rights law establishing 
penalties for interfering with others’ civil rights, though the 
statute did not specifically enumerate status characteristics—
such as race, gender or religion—of potential victims.22  
In 1981, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith 
(ADL)23 promulgated a model hate crime statute made up of two 
components: first, an institutional vandalism component, 
specifically criminalizing intentional damage to houses of 
worship, and second, an intimidation component, enhancing 
penalties for base offenses like harassment.24 By 1985, seven 
states had hate crime statutes of one kind or another, and by 
1991, that number had reached 22.25 James B. Jacobs and 
Kimberly Potter trace the actual birth of the term “hate crime” 
to the introduction of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act in the 
House of Representatives in 1985.26 The bill, which eventually 
became law in 1990, required the federal government to keep 
track of hate crimes.27 
As of this writing, Wyoming is the only state without a 
hate crime provision of any sort.28 Four other states—Arkansas, 
Georgia, Indiana, and South Carolina—lack a hate crime 
statute that enhances penalties for criminal offenses committed 
as a result of hate or bias.29 At the federal level, Congress passed 
the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act in 1994, which 
  
 21 Brian Levin, From Slavery to Hate Crime Laws: The Emergence of Race- and 
Status-Based Protection in American Criminal Law, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 227, 237 (2002). 
 22 Id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS chap. 265, § 37 (LexisNexis 2010)). 
 23 The ADL is an anti-bigotry and civil rights advocacy organization formed in 
1913. Its original mission statement specifically mentioned fighting “the defamation of the 
Jewish people,” but also proclaimed the need “to secure justice and fair treatment to all 
citizens alike and to put an end forever to unjust and unfair discrimination against and 
ridicule of any sect or body of citizens.” Anti-Defamation League, About the Anti-Defamation 
League, ADL CHARTER OCTOBER 1913, http://www.adl.org/about.asp?s=topmenuhtml (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2011). 
 24 Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words 
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation 
Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 339 (1991). 
 25 Id. 
 26 JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 4. 
 27 Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 
(codified at 28 USC § 534 (2006)). 
 28 Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, LEADERSHIP 
CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/ 
appendix-a.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 29 Id. Arkansas and Georgia provide civil remedies and criminalize 
institutional vandalism; Indiana and South Carolina criminalize institutional 
vandalism. Id.  
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mandated an increase of at least three offense levels for federal 
offenses committed out of hate or bias.30 The various statutes 
differ in the array of characteristics which may form the basis 
for a hate crime. All include race, religion, and ethnicity, but 
characteristics such as gender and sexual orientation have yet to 
be included in many of the statutes.31 
B.  Challenges to Hate Crime Laws 
Although this note focuses on objections to New York’s 
criminalization of opportunistic bias crimes, New York’s law—
and those of other states that preceded it—have already been 
subject to numerous criticisms and challenges. This section 
briefly details those prior arguments against hate crime 
legislation and how resolution of those arguments has, for the 
most part, foreclosed their application in New York. 
1. Overbreadth 
When the first hate crime laws were enacted, the debate 
surrounding them focused on whether they were overbroad 
because they criminalized conduct protected by the First 
Amendment—namely thought and speech. In Wisconsin v. 
Mitchell,32 the United States Supreme Court confronted and 
disposed of this issue, essentially preventing its exploration by 
a New York court. Mitchell, a black youth, was convicted of 
leading a bias-motivated gang assault and robbery of a white 
man after having watched the film “Mississippi Burning,” 
which depicts acts of hatred and discrimination by whites 
against blacks in the 1960s.33 The jury heard evidence that 
Mitchell yelled, “Do you all feel hyped up to move on some 
white people?” and “You all want to fuck somebody up? There 
  
 30 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 280003, Pub. L. 
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. The federal statute requires discriminatory selection. Id. 
§ 280003(b). Federal sentences are determined by reference to a chart, promulgated by 
the United States Sentencing Commission, on which the “base offense level” of the 
crime is matched with the criminal history of the defendant to arrive at a 
recommended range of time of incarceration. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual 
Ch. 5 Pt. A (2010). The “base offense level” for every form of criminal conduct is laid out 
in great detail elsewhere in the manual. Id. Ch. 2. Accordingly, any increase to the base 
offense level will necessarily result in a higher recommended range.  
 31 Anti-Defamation League, supra note 28. Compare, for example, Illinois, 
which includes sexual orientation, and Michigan, which does not. See § 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5112-7.1 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 2011). 
 32 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). 
 33 Id. at 479-80. 
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goes a white boy; go get him.”34 The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction, holding that the hate-crime statute, 
which enhanced existing sentences in cases where a victim was 
chosen for discriminatory reasons, impermissibly criminalized 
racial views and preferences.35 That court further held that the 
statute chilled free speech because it made citizens less likely 
to express prejudicial thoughts, lest they be used as evidence 
against them to prove discriminatory victim selection.36 But on 
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that enhancing penalties based upon the defendant’s 
motivation was not tantamount to the punishment of thought 
or speech.37 The Court’s reasoning stemmed primarily from the 
proposition that enhanced sentencing based on motive has 
traditionally been within the authority of sentencing judges 
and noncriminal anti-discrimination legislation.38 
The decision does not necessarily rule out a different 
result in New York. In theory, New York’s Court of Appeals 
could interpret the nearly identical free speech provision of the 
state constitution more liberally than the U.S. Supreme Court 
did its federal counterpart.39 However, given the high court’s 
ruling on the matter and the high level of acceptance hate 
crime laws have attained across the country, such a possibility 
would have to be considered remote. Some trial courts in New 
York have addressed the issue, each time ruling against the 
defendant.40 Furthermore, New York’s Office of the Attorney 
General, which has a statutory right to intervene in criminal 
proceedings in which the defendant contests the 
  
 34 Id. at 480. 
 35 State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810-12 (Wis. 1992). 
 36 Id. at 172-73. 
 37 Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484-85. 
 38 Id. 
 39 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 2001) (“Every citizen may freely speak, write 
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; 
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
 40 See People v. Ivanov, 886 N.Y.S.2d 68 (table), 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7477, 
at *8 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the statute did not violate the First Amendment; the 
defendant appears not to have raised a state constitutional claim); People v. McDowd, 
773 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (Sup. Ct. 2005), aff’d 801 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 2005); People 
v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *10-11, *14 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 
2001) (holding that no authority exists explicitly establishing that New Yorkers’ rights 
under Art. I § 8 of the state constitution are different from their rights under the First 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution). 
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constitutionality of a statute,41 has taken the position that the 
scope of free speech under the federal and state constitutions is 
nearly identical, if not actually so.42  
The likely unavailability of a judicial finding of 
overbreadth has not entirely silenced critics whose objections 
stem from concerns about government control of thought. Even 
if hate crime statutes do no such thing, several scholars have 
argued that, as a matter of policy, it is better not to even risk 
discouraging bigoted thought through the criminal law.43 
2. Vagueness 
Another constitutional objection—vagueness—has not 
yet been confronted by the Supreme Court.44 Nevertheless, 
Oregon’s high court has considered the issue and found a hate 
crime statute similar to New York’s sufficiently specific to 
survive a vagueness challenge.45 Furthermore, several New York 
trial level courts have considered and disposed of the issue.46 
  
 41 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 71 (Consol. 2010). The statute is not clear as to 
whether the Attorney General’s right of intervention applies exclusively to state 
constitutional challenges, or both state and federal constitutional challenges. Id.  
 42 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment 
Counts for the Attorney General at 7, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406. 
 43 See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 24, at 381 (“Beginning with the most basic of 
values underlying the First Amendment, laws which limit or chill thought and 
expression detract from the goal of insuring the availability of the broadest possible 
range of ideas and expression in the marketplace of ideas.”). 
 44 The Supreme Court, in Mitchell, did not reach the defendant’s vagueness 
claim, as it was not pressed in the court below and fell outside the scope of the grant of 
certiorari. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1993). 
 45 See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 561 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (“The crime 
is defined in sufficiently clear and explicit terms to apprise defendant and others of 
what conduct is prohibited.”). It should be noted, however, that the Oregon statute’s 
wording is not identical to the New York statute. The Oregon statute refers to belief or 
perception regarding the victim, OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (2010), while the 
New York statute requires the same belief or perception regarding “a person,” N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 485.10 (Consol. 2010). 
 46 See, e.g., People v. Ivanov, 886 N.Y.S.2d 68, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7477, 
at *8 (Sup. Ct. 2008); People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 637 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Diaz, 727 
N.Y.S.2d at 300-01. Nevertheless, there is an intriguing argument to be made for 
vagueness, particularly with regard to statutes, like New York’s, that refer to the race, 
religion, etc., of “a person.” As Susan Gellman has pointed out, such language leaves 
open certain strange but entirely possible situations. For example, such a statute 
might conceivably punish a white woman who attacks another white woman she 
overhears using a racial slur on a black child. Gellman, supra note 24, at 355-56. 
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3. Policy and Practice 
Additionally, detractors have argued that hate crime 
statutes of this sort do nothing to actually deter hate crimes, 
but rather amount to an opportunity for legislators to “take a 
stand” or “go on record” against prejudice.47 Alternatively, some 
have predicted that even statutes worded so as to result in 
equal prosecution of, for example, black-on-white violence as 
white-on-black violence, would not be equally applied in 
practice.48 These policy- and practice-based arguments against 
hate crime laws are not as easily disposed of, for they rely, at 
least in part, upon one’s perception of the political process. An 
in-depth discussion of their validity is beyond the scope of this 
note, beyond briefly noting that forty-five states have enacted 
legislation of this variety.49 
C. Categories of Hate Crimes Statutes 
Enacted hate crime laws take four basic forms: criminal 
civil rights laws, civil causes of action, penalty enhancers, and 
substantive crimes.50 Civil rights laws criminalize the 
interference with the exercise of certain civil rights, for 
  
 47 See, e.g., JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 67 (“Politicians specialize in 
symbolic pronouncements. They enthusiastically support laws that reaffirm widely 
revered values such as ‘the flag,’ ‘patriotism,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘tolerance.’ Supporting hate 
crime legislation provides them an excellent opportunity to put themselves on record as 
opposed to criminals and prejudice and in favor of law and order, decency, and 
tolerance.”); Editorial, Triangulating ‘Hate Crimes,’ N.Y. POST, Apr. 8, 1999, at 28 (“For 
all their seemingly good intentions, hate-crime laws serve no purpose other than to 
make their sponsors feel good about themselves. As weapons against hatred and 
prejudice, they are worthless.”). The Fox defendants appeared to be sounding this note 
in their motion to dismiss, arguing that unless the statute were narrowly construed to 
require animus, “the charges are inapposite to the intent and purpose of the statute 
and will be arbitrarily enforced not to protect sections of our community, but rather to 
serve political motives.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s 
Motion to Dismiss at 2, Fox, 884 N.Y.S.2d 627 (No. 8607/06). 
 48 See, e.g., Brian S. MacNamara, New York’s Hate Crimes Act of 2000: 
Problematic and Redundant Legislation Aimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 ALB. L. 
REV. 519, 537 (2003) (“Both the police and district attorneys are likely to bend in the 
direction of the prevailing political winds; as one advocacy group gets louder, more bias 
crimes against that group will be charged and prosecuted, adding further legitimacy to 
that particular group’s claims of victimization.” (citing JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 
20, at 20-21)). Interestingly, this concern appears to have taken hold on both the left 
and the right. See Gellman, supra note 24, at 361 (expressing concern that a hate crime 
statute might be applied disproportionately to black youths hurling anti-white 
invective at police officers). 
 49 See supra Part I.A. 
 50 JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 29. 
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example, school attendance or voting.51 Cause-of-action laws 
give the victim of an alleged hate crime or a person whose 
rights have been interfered with an opportunity to sue civilly 
for damages.52 Penalty enhancers are criminal codes which 
increase the punishment for certain enumerated crimes when 
the finder of fact determines that the motivation was hate- or 
bias-related.53 Finally, some jurisdictions define hate crimes 
separately as independent, substantive crimes, rather than an 
enhancement to other base crimes.54 
It is the latter two varieties which are of primary 
interest here. The distinction between penalty-enhancing 
statutes and substantive-crime-creating statutes is primarily a 
procedural one and not related to the focus of this note. 
However, these types of statutes, taken as a group, divide in 
another, more substantive fashion. As a rule, they are either 
“discriminatory selection” statutes or “group animus” statutes.55 
The former define a hate crime as any offense in which the 
victim is selected for discriminatory reasons.56 The latter 
further requires that those discriminatory reasons include 
specific negative feeling or animus towards the group of which 
the victim is perceived to have been a member.57 Thus, group 
animus statutes criminalize a more specific subset of the 
offenses targeted by discriminatory selection statutes. 
Discriminatory selection statutes would proscribe any type of 
bias crime—whether it be a crime of “pure hate” or an 
opportunistic bias crime. Group animus statutes, on the other 
hand, would only criminalize crimes of pure hate.58  
  
 51 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006). 
 52 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51.7, 52, 52.1 (Deering 2010). 
 53 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.10 (Consol. 2010). 
 54 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining the 
crime of “ethnic intimidation”). In practice, there is little difference between this 
substantive crime and a penalty-enhancing statute like New York’s, as Ohio defines 
“ethnic intimidation” in terms of several enumerated, previously existing base offenses. 
 55 FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN 
LAW 29-30 (1999). 
 56 Id. As noted, New York’s hate crime statute is based on the discriminatory 
selection model. Lawrence cites other examples, most notably the Wisconsin statute, which 
was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 190 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1997)). 
 57 LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 30. Lawrence cites, among others, New 
Hampshire’s statute, which uses the operative language, because “of hostility towards the 
victim’s religion, race, creed[, etc.].” Id. at 191 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1997)). 
 58 This distinction will be discussed further infra Part III. 
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II. THE NEW YORK STATE HATE CRIMES ACT OF 2000 
At this point, a brief summary of the statute itself is 
warranted. Part A will guide the reader through the basic 
provisions written into the law. Part B will undertake a 
comprehensive review of those provisions, with an eye toward 
discerning the intent of the drafters with respect to the issue of 
opportunistic bias crimes. Part B will also examine all relevant 
external materials, including legislative and executive documents, 
press reports, and letters from the public.  
A. Overview 
With the passage of the Hate Crimes Act of 2000, New 
York became the 44th state to enact a statute enhancing criminal 
penalties for crimes committed out of bias or hate.59 The New York 
statute was based in large measure upon the Wisconsin statute 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.60 The 
law includes a wide range of characteristics as listed triggers: 
“race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious 
practice, age, disability[,] or sexual orientation.”61 It is similarly 
wide ranging in the array of base offenses which can be enhanced 
if a jury finds that bias or hate was the motivation.62 The 
sentencing scheme generally provides that each base offense is 
enhanced by one offense level.63 
The main portion of section 485.05 of the penal law 
contains two provisions outlining the basic contours of hate 
crimes as defined in the law. The first specifies that a hate 
crime is committed when the defendant commits an 
enumerated substantive offense and selects the victim based 
upon a belief or perception regarding any of the above-listed 
characteristics.64 The second specifies that a hate crime is 
committed when the defendant commits the enumerated 
  
 59 MacNamara, supra note 48, at 519. 
 60 Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR, at 1 (2000); see also 
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 485.05 (McKinney Supp. 
2002) (“In drafting its statute, New York was apparently guided by both a Wisconsin 
statute whose constitutionality had been sustained and a model statute published by the 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL).” (citation omitted)); MacNamara, supra note 48, at 523. 
 61 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (Consol. 2010). 
 62 Id. § 485.05(3). Scores of statutory offenses are listed, including the major 
felonies of murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, arson, assault, and kidnapping. 
 63 Id. § 485.10. For Class A-1 felonies, a hate crime conviction increases the 
minimum, but not the maximum. 
 64 Id. § 485.05(1)(a). 
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substantive offense because of such a belief.65 Put more simply, 
to be a hate crime, discriminatory selection may be behind 
either the choice of victim or the decision to commit the crime 
at all.66 Neither provision requires that the belief or perception 
must regard the victim in particular; both sections use the 
language “belief or perception regarding the [listed 
characteristics] of a person.”67 This appears to allow application 
to cases of mistaken identity, in much the same way that many 
states’ intentional murder statutes require intent to kill a 
person—but not necessarily the same person who dies.68 
The statute also includes additional evidentiary and 
definitional material.69 It specifically indicates that proof of the 
characteristics of the defendant, the victim, or both is legally 
insufficient to prove the hate crime motivation.70 The statute 
also defines two terms as used in the list of characteristics: age 
(“sixty years old or more”)71 and disability (“a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity”).72 
Finally, one unusual feature of the statute is the 
inclusion of legislative findings in the actual text of the law. 
Section 485.00 outlines the legislature’s rationale and goals in 
passing the law, listing, in particular, a finding that hate 
crimes have increased substantially in recent years and that, 
by their nature, they cause harm to entire communities.73 In 
large part, it was the inclusion of these legislative findings that 
prompted the Fox defendants to make their argument for a 
limitation on the scope of the law.74 
B. Legislative Intent 
As noted, the text of section 485.05 makes no distinction 
between crimes of pure hate and crimes of opportunity. In 
  
 65 Id. § 485.05(1)(b). 
 66 Legislative materials explain that the second subsection was included to 
cover crimes where the perpetrator clearly exhibits group animus, but where no 
particular victim is intentionally selected—such as firebombing a predominantly black 
church without knowing who, in particular, is inside. Memorandum, Governor’s 
Program Bill No. 1RR, at 2 (2000). 
 67 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1)(a)(b) (emphasis added). 
 68 See, e.g., id. § 125.25. 
 69 Id. § 485.05. 
 70 Id. § 485.05(2). 
 71 Id. § 485.05(4)(a). 
 72 Id. § 485.05(4)(b). 
 73 Id. § 485.00. 
 74 People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see also infra Part II.B.6. 
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requiring simply that the victim be selected, or the crime be 
committed, because of a belief or perception regarding a 
person’s race, religion, or other characteristics, it embraces 
both traditional hate crimes and more nuanced fact patterns, 
such as the Sandy case, that invite categorization as 
opportunistic bias crimes. In fact, section 485.05 has been 
applied across a wide spectrum of crimes, from those as 
nebulous as the Fox case to those as clear cut as “race war” 
murderer Phillip Grant.75 
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the 
drafters of the Hate Crime Act intended so broad a scope. A 
review of the legislative history suggests that crimes of pure 
hate were the primary types of offenses the legislature sought 
to punish with this statute. At the very least, the legislative 
history tells us that the crimes-of-hate/crimes-of-opportunity 
distinction was a nuance that escaped most of the public debate 
and discussion on the bill. 
A few words about legislative intent are in order before 
we examine the statute and its history. In declining to engage in 
an exhaustive examination of the Hate Crimes Act’s legislative 
history, the Fox court averred, “the hate crimes charges in this 
case are consistent with the intent of the Legislature as 
manifested by the plain language of Penal Law § 485.05(1)(a).”76 
In other words, a court need not engage in an examination of 
legislative history, nor draw on rules of construction, nor delve 
into the contemporary political or social controversies that 
surrounded enactment of the statute, if the statute itself is 
unambiguous.77 Invocation of this simple, rational, and well-
established rule shortened the court’s task in Fox.  
  
 75 Philip Grant, an African-American man, was charged with waiting in a 
Westchester mall stairwell for hours before fatally stabbing Concetta Russo-Carriero, 
who was white. Grant later told investigators that he wanted to start a “race war” and 
that “the first person I see in this mall that looks white, I’m killing. . . . As long as she 
had blond hair and blue eyes, she was going to die.” Lisa W. Foderaro, Murder Suspect 
Told Police He Hunted a White Woman, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at B3. 
 76 Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 633. 
 77 See N.Y. STAT. § 76 (McKinney 2011) (“Where words of a statute are free 
from ambiguity and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the legislative intent, resort 
may not be had to other means of interpretation.”); 97 N.Y. JUR. STATUTES § 104 (“As 
the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any 
case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain 
meaning thereof. . . . Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts 
must give effect to its plain meaning. . . . Generally, the unambiguous language of the 
statute is alone determinative. Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and 
clearly express the legislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of 
interpretation such as the rules of construction, for courts should not interpret what 
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This note, however, seeks to conduct just such a far-
reaching analysis. It is well-established that where the 
statutory text is not clear, where the plain language does not 
spell out the legislative intent, resort may be had to all manner 
of supporting materials, including legislative memoranda, 
public statements, and floor debates.78 Because the task here is 
to ascertain the legislature’s true intent—putting aside 
presumptions about the unambiguous statutory language—this 
note will consider all possible sources that shed light on the 
intended scope of the Hate Crimes Act.  
1. The Statute 
Entitled “legislative findings,” section 485.00 precedes 
the actual statutory definition of the crime and provides the 
reader of the Penal Law with an unusual statement of purpose 
by the legislature.79 Only two other sections of the Penal Law 
include the legislative findings in the actual text of the 
statutes: the enterprise corruption statute, the state’s analog to 
federal RICO provisions, and the state anti-terror law.80 
  
has no need of interpretation.”); Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank v. Bd. of Assessors, 669 
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009-10 (1998). 
 78 See generally, 97 N.Y. Jur. Statutes §§ 105, 114, 146, 148. 
 79 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00. The full text of the findings are as follows: 
The legislature finds and determines as follows: criminal acts involving 
violence, intimidation and destruction of property based upon bias and 
prejudice have become more prevalent in New York state in recent years. The 
intolerable truth is that in these crimes, commonly and justly referred to as 
“hate crimes”, victims are intentionally selected, in whole or in part, because 
of their race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious 
practice, age, disability or sexual orientation. Hate crimes do more than 
threaten the safety and welfare of all citizens. They inflict on victims 
incalculable physical and emotional damage and tear at the very fabric of free 
society. Crimes motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups not 
only harm individual victims but send a powerful message of intolerance and 
discrimination to all members of the group to which the victim belongs. Hate 
crimes can and do intimidate and disrupt entire communities and vitiate the 
civility that is essential to healthy democratic processes. In a democratic 
society, citizens cannot be required to approve of the beliefs and practices of 
others, but must never commit criminal acts on account of them. Current law 
does not adequately recognize the harm to public order and individual safety 
that hate crimes cause. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to provide 
clear recognition of the gravity of hate crimes and the compelling importance 
of preventing their recurrence.  
Accordingly, the legislature finds and declares that hate crimes should be 
prosecuted and punished with appropriate severity. 
Id.  
 80 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00, 490.00 (2011). 
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Two passages in the legislative findings are at least 
arguably inconsistent with the statutory definition that follows. 
First, the findings refer to victims being selected “because of 
their race, color, national origin, [etc.]” rather than, as it is 
phrased in section 485.05, “because of a belief or perception 
regarding the race, color, national origin, [etc.].”81 The section 
485.05 phrasing quite clearly employs language evincing an 
intent to include situations where perpetrators are motivated 
by such prejudicial beliefs—situations such as the perception in 
Fox that a gay victim would make an easy mark. The section 
485.00 language, however, is more ambiguous; it lends itself to 
both that expansive interpretation but also the narrower, 
traditional, “pure hate” construction.82 
Second, and more significantly, the legislative findings 
make reference to “[c]rimes motivated by invidious hatred 
toward particular groups.”83 There is no ambiguity there. The 
American Heritage Dictionary defines “invidious” as “tending 
to rouse ill will, animosity, or resentment,” or “containing or 
implying a slight.”84 If the use of the word “hatred” alone was 
not clear enough, its modification with the term “invidious” 
provides certainty that the drafters of this law envisioned its 
application to gay bashing and other pure hate attacks.85  
There is also a third passage that is instructive with 
respect to the intended scope of the statute, one that might 
easily be overlooked because it is not truly a “passage.” It is the 
act’s title. The title suggests rather strongly that the harm to 
be remedied here was “hate”—not misperceptions, stereotypes, 
or even bias. There is a credible argument to be made that the 
statute’s title is a valid indicator of the law’s legislative intent. 
It is well established that courts in New York State are 
instructed to discern legislative intent through a contextual 
  
 81 Id. §§ 485.00, 485.05 (emphasis added). 
 82 The language employed in section 485.00, by its omission of the words 
“belief or perception regarding” found in section 485.05, invites a common-sense 
reading: a victim who is selected “because of” his race is, in most people’s 
understanding, the victim of a hate crime. 
 83 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05. 
 84 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (3d 
ed. 1992). 
 85 Courts in New York routinely interpret statutes so as to accord significance 
to every word. See Toys “R” Us v. Silva, 89 N.Y.2d 411, 420 (1996) (construing 
discontinuation of “‘substantially’ all the nonconforming use[s]” to mean something less 
than complete cessation of nonconforming uses), rev’g Toys “R” Us v. Silva, 229 A.D.2d 
308, 310 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t. 1996) (“A basic rule of statutory construction 
requires that meaning and effect be given to every part and word of the statute.”) 
(Kupferman, J., dissenting).  
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prism, taking into account all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding its passage.86 In its affirmation as intervenor in 
People v. Amadeo,87 the Attorney General examined the Hate 
Crimes Act’s title in just such a fashion, interpreting “context” 
to include the title of an act as well.88 
2. Supporting Documents 
The legislative materials relevant to the Hate Crimes 
Act of 2000 are neither voluminous nor conclusively 
illuminating. However, to the extent they are helpful in the 
instant inquiry, they offer no indication that the bill’s drafters 
or supporters envisioned the application of the law to extend to 
opportunistic hate crimes. The Budget Report on the bill does 
not mention the issue at all under “Arguments in Opposition,” 
though it does summarize several other objections.89 The 
Governor’s Memorandum in Support, in deconstructing section 
485.05(2), states that this section, which establishes the 
evidentiary burden to be met, “is designed to ensure that only 
those who are truly motivated by invidious hatred are 
prosecuted for committing hate crimes.”90 
Letters included in the Governor’s bill jacket provide 
additional insights into the law’s purpose. The Roman Catholic 
Bishops of New York State, which opposed the bill, expressed 
several reservations, including the loss of discretion by judges, 
the potential for disparate application and the absence of 
alternatives to incarceration.91 Only one issue raised by the 
group even suggests superficial awareness of the crimes-of-
  
 86 N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95 (Consol. 2010). 
 87 People v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *1 (Sup. 
Ct. Aug. 1, 2001). 
 88 Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment Counts at 9 & 
n.4, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 (No. 3523/2000). To be sure, the term “hate 
crime” can also be understood more generally as embracing a wide variety of bias 
offenses, but the Office of the Attorney General, the state’s chief law enforcement 
agency, did not take that position in Amadeo. The Attorney General’s memorandum of 
law is discussed more fully infra Part II.B.6.  
 89 BUDGET REPORT ON BILLS, S. 4691a, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2000), 
http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf (part of legislative packet 
listing arguments in opposition, including the redundancy of such legislation and the 
impropriety of punishing motivation or belief). 
 90 Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR at 2 (2000). 
 91 Letter from the N.Y. State Catholic Conference to Members of the N.Y. 
Senate (Apr. 3, 2000), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/ 
96904.pdf (part of legislative packet; attaching a 1999 statement of the Roman Catholic 
Bishops of N.Y. State).  
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opportunity/crimes-of-hate problem: the bill’s “fail[ure] to 
distinguish between an isolated offense and deep-seated bias.”92 
Two important governmental bodies, in letters to the 
Governor, expressed a clear view that the new law would 
embrace only crimes of pure hate. In its letter expressing its 
support for the measure, the Office of the Attorney General 
appeared to take as a given that the statute was meant to 
punish “hate,” noting,  
[b]y employing this new law to the fullest, our government will send 
a powerful message to victims and others like them that, regardless 
of personal characteristics or lifestyle, they are valued members of 
the community, and will make clear to victimizers that this state 
does not tolerate hatred founded upon bias and prejudice.93 
The Attorney General’s Legislative Bureau Chief could just as 
easily have chosen the words, “this state does not tolerate bias 
and prejudice.” Additionally, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s 
legislative representative, Anthony Piscitelli, sounded a 
virtually identical note, writing, “[e]nactment of this legislation 
would also indicate to all New Yorkers that the New York State 
Legislature is willing to act to provide solutions to help stem 
the tide of hate motivated violence.”94 
Eight letter writers cited notable hate crimes that 
occurred elsewhere in the country shortly before the passage of 
the Hate Crimes Act as examples of the “terrible occurrences” the 
new law would prevent.95 The two incidents most commonly cited 
  
 92 Id. 
 93 Memorandum from Kathy Bennett, Chief, Legislative Bureau, Office of the 
Att’y Gen., to James M. McGuire, Counsel to the Governor 2 (July 18, 2000) (emphasis 
added), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf (part of 
legislative packet). 
 94 Letter from Anthony Piscitelli, Legislative Rep. to Mayor Giuliani, to George E. 
Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. 2 (July 7, 2000), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/ 
images/images/96904.pdf (part of legislative packet). Giuliani himself sounded a similar note in 
the aftermath of a violent anti-Semitic rampage at a Jewish center in Los Angeles in 1999:  
I understand, since I spent a lot of my life in law enforcement, that 
legislation like the hate-crimes legislation doesn’t necessarily prevent an act 
like this. It’s an after-the-fact punishment as opposed to something that could 
be done before . . . But the statement is a very strong societal statement 
against hatred and maybe over a period of time that could help wipe out this 
irrational way of behaving. 
Brendan Bourne et al., Racist Faces Death Penalty—Charged in Postal Slay and Kid 
Shootings, N.Y. POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at 6.  
 95 Letter from Herbert I. Cohen, M.D., to Sen. Joseph Bruno (Mar. 12, 1999); 
Letter from Doris Corrigan, State Committeewoman, to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. 
(Mar. 16, 1999); Letter from Georgia K. Guida to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 
2, 1999); Letter from Amy Klein to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 5, 1999); Letter 
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in the letters are probably among the most infamous “pure hate” 
acts of violence in the public consciousness: the dragging death of 
James Byrd, Jr., by white supremacists in Jasper, Texas, in 1998, 
and the beating death of gay University of Wyoming student 
Matthew Shepard the same year in Laramie, Wyoming.96 
3. The Assembly Bill 
A different piece of hate crime legislation that was under 
consideration contemporaneously offers some clues as to the 
legislative intent behind the bill that was passed. 97 The bill that 
became the Hate Crimes Act of 2000 originated in the Senate at 
the behest of the Governor.98 By contrast, the Assembly had 
passed its own bill during each of the previous eleven years, only 
to see it fail in the Senate each time.99 The 1999-2000 legislative 
session was no exception. The Assembly bill had passed the 
Assembly and was—yet again—being denied a floor vote in the 
Senate, when that body passed the Governor’s bill.100  
There were significant differences between the two 
pieces of legislation. Rather than enhancing sentences for 
crimes where bias was a motive, Assembly bill A.1573 created a 
separate crime of bias-motivated violence or intimidation.101 
Like its Senate counterpart, it included legislative findings, but 
  
from Robin S. Merrill to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 10, 1999); Letter from 
Helen Quirini to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (undated); Letter from Michael Rubinovitz 
to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 11, 1999); Letter from Herbert K. Reis, Esq., to 
George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 12, 1999). All letters are part of the legislative packet 
and can be viewed at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf. 
 96 See sources cited supra note 95. Matthew Shepard, a 22-year-old, openly 
gay University of Wyoming student, was beaten, burned, and tied to a fence in October 
1998 after two men, pretending to be gay, approached him at a Laramie bar. James 
Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, 
at A9. He succumbed to his injuries a short time later. James Brooke, Gay Man Dies 
from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A1. James 
Byrd, Jr., a black man, was beaten and chained to a car by three white supremacists, 
then dragged for some two miles to his death in June 1998. Carol Marie Cropper, Black 
Man Fatally Dragged in a Possible Racial Killing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16. 
 97 Where the final version of a bill passed differs from an earlier version, a 
court may infer that the drafters of the final version were aware of those differences 
and consciously intended them. See Kimmel v. State of New York, 906 N.Y.S.2d 403, 
408 (N.Y. App. Div., 4th Dep’t. 2010) (finding that final 1989 version of the Equal 
Access to Justice Act was intended to have broader reach than the rejected 1982, 1983, 
1984 and 1986 versions). 
 98 See Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR (2000). 
 99 Liam Pleven, Analysis / By Any Means Necessary / Nassau Republicans 
Support Liberal Bills to Win Votes, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 25, 2000, at A17. 
 100 Editorial, Taking Action on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at A14. 
 101 A.1573 § 4, 1999 Assem., 222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999). 
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it differed in that it would have explicitly made the findings a 
functioning part of the statute, thus eliminating the 
uncertainty surrounding the purpose of the findings included 
in the bill that was passed.102 In sum, the legislative findings 
were included to guard against prosecutorial overreaching: 
Section 1 of the bill required prosecutors to submit an 
attestation to accompany the grand jury indictment averring 
that he or she had found the grand jury review of the evidence 
to be consistent with the legislative findings.103 Section 2 of the 
bill gave defendants the right to move for dismissal on the 
grounds that the application of the law in a particular case was 
not consistent with the legislative findings.104 If those provisions 
did not provide a clear enough indication that the Assembly 
was concerned with over-application, its memo on the bill offers 
an explicit rationale for the inclusion of the findings.105  
None of this means that the framers of the Hate Crimes 
Act of 2000—in the version that passed—intended anything 
different. However, the existence of A. 1573 at least put the 
Senate and the Governor’s legislative team on notice that the 
issue of overreaching should be a concern. The legislature’s 
decision not to include a similar provision in the enacted 
legislation can be interpreted as a conscious decision to pass a 
bill that folded opportunistic bias crimes within its purview. 
  
 102 See supra Part II.B.1. 
 103 A.1573 § 1. In other words, the bill would have imposed on prosecutors the 
quasi-judicial duty to determine legislative intent and to circumscribe their own 
charging decisions. 
 104 Id. § 2. 
 105 Memorandum on Provisions in the Bias Bill, A.1573, 1999 Assem., 222d 
Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (“The bill includes a statement of ‘Legislative Findings.’ This 
statement is intended to make it clear that it is not enough for the accused to merely be 
of a different ethnic background, gender, physical condition or sexual orientation of the 
victim for this statute to come into play. There must be a showing that the defendant 
had the specific intent to deprive an individual or group of an enumerated civil right.”). 
In explaining the structure and function of the proposed law to its critics on the 
Assembly floor, its sponsor, Assemblyman Arthur Eve, engaged in the following 
illuminating colloquy with colleague David Seaman: 
Mr. Seaman: It has to be proven that it was done not because it was easier to 
take the pocketbook away from the senior citizen— 
Mr. Eve: That’s right. 
Mr. Seaman:—but because there was some disregard for that senior citizen? 
Mr. Eve: That’s right. Because of their age. 
N.Y. Assembly Debate on Assembly Bill A.1573, at 16 (Jan. 19, 1999). 
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4. Public Statements 
The individual legislators who sponsored and voted for 
the Hate Crimes Act offered the public various arguments in 
its favor, though very few have any relevance to discerning 
their intent as to the inclusion of crimes of opportunity in the 
statute’s scope. To the small extent legislators’ public 
statements were relevant to this issue, most appear to support 
a pure-hate-only interpretation of the bill.106 The same 
perceptions are evident in statements by other politicians 
weighing in publicly on the bill’s merits.107 
  
 106 For example, when the bill was passed, State Senator Roy Goodman, a 
Manhattan Republican who sponsored the bill in the Senate, told reporters that, “This 
[bill] recognizes that a bias crime is a crime not committed against an individual but a 
whole class of people,” while specifically mentioning hate-based gay-bashing incidents. 
Tom Precious, After 11 Tries, State Senate Is Set to Pass Hate-Crime Law, BUFFALO 
NEWS, June 7, 2000, at 8B. Goodman, addressing the Senate, was even less measured, 
telling his Albany colleagues, “And I say to you that what we are attempting to deal 
with here is some of the darkest and most tragic impulses which enter warped minds 
who seek to take out vengeance upon specific groups . . . .” N.Y. Senate Debate on 
Senate Bill S4691A, at 4533-34 (June 7, 2000). 
  The bill passed in 2000, in large part because Senator Joseph Bruno, the 
majority leader who blocked the bill the previous eleven years, changed course and 
agreed to support it—albeit grudgingly. Bruno told Newsday:  
I don’t believe that a bias or hate bill by itself is going to do anything to 
reduce crime. But I believe that the message that we’re focusing on people 
who have malice in their hearts or hate or a bias towards an individual or 
group. . . . [M]aybe the time has come for us to send that message out there.  
Jordan Rau & Liam Pleven, Bias Bill Is Expected to Advance, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 7, 
2000, at A07. Bruno’s faint praise evidenced a narrower view of the legislation as directed 
strictly at hate, and he said much the same thing the same day in the Senate chamber 
during floor debate: “I have a feeling still that this legislation is more perception than it is 
substance.” N.Y. Senate Debate on Senate Bill S4691A, at 4530 (June 7, 2000).  
  On the other hand, not all legislators and public officials restricted their 
view of hate crimes to offenses of pure hate. Then-state Senator David Paterson told 
reporters in June 2000 that the spate of sexual assaults during the Puerto Rican Day 
Parade that year were proper crimes to be charged under the statute. Thomas J. 
Lueck, Manhattan: Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2000, at B8 (“The appalling 
assaults that occurred following the Puerto Rican Day Parade in Central Park meet the 
test.”). I presume here that Paterson meant that the hate crime statute could be 
applied to the selection of the victims as women, not as non-Latinas. Nevertheless, in 
either eventuality, there was no evidence of group animus in the assaults. 
 107 Westchester District Attorney Jeanine Pirro spoke out in favor of the law, 
calling attention, with examples, to strictly hate-based incidents. Pirro told the New 
York Times in a 2000 interview, “We’ve seen explosions in Westchester. We’ve seen 
stabbings. We’ve seen people assaulted. We’ve seen people who just open their own 
door and have someone say to them, ‘I don’t like people like you living in my country. 
Go back to where you came from.’” Kate Stone Lombardi, County Arms Itself to Battle 
Internet’s Messengers of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at 14WC. Even critics failed to 
perceive—or at least were not concerned by—the possibility that crimes of opportunity 
with little actual “hate” would be swept up by the statute. Conservative Party chair 
Michael Long objected primarily to the bill’s creation—in his view, at least—of 
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5. Public Debate and Media Coverage 
Naturally, much of the public debate over the passage of 
the bill took place on the opinion pages of the state’s major 
newspapers. By and large—regardless of which side the writers 
or editorial boards took—the understanding appears to have 
been that the law would cover crimes motivated by hate. The 
concept of opportunistic bias crimes seems not to have played 
any role in the position of the print media.  
Not surprisingly, those in favor of the bill chose to 
highlight the most heinous and disturbing crimes of pure hate, 
since such crimes would likely strike an emotional chord with 
readers. Writing in the Daily News, for example, columnist Albor 
Ruiz highlighted the killing of a gay, black Long Island teenager 
by his white father as a horrific example of the type of offenses 
the Hate Crimes Act would combat.108 A New York Times editorial 
calling for the passage of a compromise bill that would reconcile 
different Assembly and Senate versions clearly showed that the 
Times’ editorial board believed the bill would punish—or at least 
was meant to punish—only crimes of pure hate.109 
One might reasonably expect that the bill’s opponents, 
in particular, would perceive the bill to have criminalized 
borderline conduct such as opportunistic bias crimes. Instead, 
the opinion pages of newspapers opposing the legislation were 
filled with wider objections to hate crimes in general. 
Regarding efficacy, for example, one writer in the Daily News 
suggested that the hate-crime “problem” was not as pervasive 
as believed, and that similar legislation across the United 
States had had little effect in combating it.110 Seeing the bill as 
a monument to identity politics, the New York Post proclaimed, 
“We may be a land of equal justice under law, but the 
  
protected classes, telling the Buffalo News, “Isn’t the average person’s life and safety 
worth just as much as a homosexual?” Precious, supra note 106. Long misapprehends 
the bill’s even-handedness: the statute would punish equally an attack by gays on a 
heterosexual whose sexual orientation was related to the crime’s motive.  
 108 Albor Ruiz, Horrific Slay May Revive Hate-Crime Legislation, DAILY NEWS 
(N.Y.), March 30, 2000, at Suburban 4. 
 109 Editorial, Attacking Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A30 (“This 
week the State Senate finally approved a bill that will increase punishments for those 
convicted of crimes motivated by hatred.”). 
 110 Edward Lewine, Hate Law: Paper Tiger?, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 16, 
2000, at 13. 
1620 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
inescapable conclusion one draws from these laws is: Some 
groups are more equal than others.”111  
In fact, it was the rare commentator who perceived the 
crimes-of-hate/crimes-of-opportunity distinction, and even then, 
it appears only to have been singled out regarding sex crimes. 
Only one news editorial came close to isolating the issue, 
asking if heterosexual rapes would henceforth be prosecuted as 
hate crimes.112 
6. Court Interpretations 
Ordinarily, appellate courts’ interpretations would 
provide some of the best clues as to the legislative intent of a 
statue and would, at any rate, constitute binding resolutions of 
doubts as to a statute’s meaning.113 Unfortunately, the New 
York appellate courts have had precious little opportunity to 
contemplate the Hate Crimes Act. As of June 2011, the Court 
of Appeals had done so in detail only once.114 The four Appellate 
Divisions have decided only eighteen cases involving the 
statute. None directly address the question of the statute’s 
intended scope.115 With respect to the direct appeals of Fox and 
Fortunato themselves, the former has not yet been decided, and 
the latter did not raise any Hate Crimes Act-related issues.116 
Of the trial courts that have discussed this issue, 
however, as of the time of the writing of this note, only Fox 
  
 111 Rod Dreher, Is It a Hate Crime to Beat up Sickos in Sheets?, N.Y. POST, 
Oct. 19, 1999, at 18. The context of the discussion was enhancement of the federal hate 
crime statute to include sexual orientation, but the point was directed at hate crime 
laws in general, and presumably the New York bill then under discussion in Albany. 
 112 See Editorial, Targeting Hate; Details to Come, BUFFALO NEWS, June 13, 
2000, at 2B; The issue was, however, flagged by legal journalists. See Glenn Pincus, 
Courts and Prosecutors Face New Hate Crime Act, N.Y. L.J, Sept. 21, 2000, at 1 (calling 
the inclusion of sex crimes in the act “probably an unintended result calling for 
considerable prosecutorial restraint and discretion”). 
 113  N.Y. STAT. LAW § 77 (McKinney 2011) (“The construction of a statute is a 
question of law for the court and should not be submitted to the jury.”). 
 114 In People v. Assi, 928 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 2010), the Court of Appeals 
addressed two issues not relevant to this note. First, the court held that the statute 
applied to property crimes, despite the reference to “a person” in section 485.05. Id. at 
391. Second, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute had not yet taken 
effect on October 8, 2010, the day of the events at issue, because it was a Sunday. Id. at 
392. The Assi case is discussed further infra Part III. 
 115 The vast majority consider appeals of hate crime convictions, or their 
Family Court equivalents, where the appellant argues that the verdict was against the 
weight of the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 2008); In 
re Vanna W., 846 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2007). 
 116 People v. Fortunato, 903 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 2010), leave to appeal 
denied, 15 N.Y.3d 893 (2010). 
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subjected this issue to a thorough analysis. As noted above,117 the 
defendants in Fox claimed that that their selection of Sandy as 
the victim of their criminal scheme was motivated by 
opportunistic calculation, not hatred of gays, and thus fell 
outside the statute.118 They pointed to the cooperating defendant 
Gary Timmins’ grand jury testimony that defendant Fortunato 
told the group that he had contacted and robbed gay men in the 
past, and that “this was an easy way to rob someone.”119  
In rejecting the defendants’ claim that their alleged 
conduct fell outside the scope of the statute, the trial judge, Jill 
Konviser, suggested that the defendants were, in effect, asking 
the court to redefine the clear meaning of the statute.120 The 
judge declined to do so, noting specifically that the inclusion of 
the legislative findings in the statute—whatever its purpose—
did nothing to alter the clear language of section 485.05.121 
Rather, she suggested an interpretation of the legislative 
findings (and for that matter, the statute’s title) that did 
considerably less violence to the law’s practical scope: that the 
legislature, in including the language it did, made a finding 
that opportunistic bias crimes were of equivalent odiousness to 
crime of pure hate and thus could be subsumed under a statute 
that mainly criminalized the latter.122 
The Fox court did not subject the Hate Crime Act to 
much scrutiny. This need not have been the case, since the trial 
judge, having served as Governor Pataki’s Senior Assistant 
Counsel from 1997 to 2002, was uniquely positioned to offer an 
insider’s perspective on legislative intent.123 However, as the 
judge herself pointed out in the Fox opinion, once the court 
  
 117 For a brief review of the facts of Fox, see supra Part I. 
 118 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s Motion to 
Dismiss at 2, People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (No. 8607/06) (“[T]hey did 
so not because of any animus or prejudice against gays which is the heart and soul of 
this legislation.”). 
 119 Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 631. 
 120 Id. at 633 (“The defendants implicitly recognize that their conduct falls 
within the plain language of the hate crimes statute and seek to avoid its implications 
by asking this court to redefine a hate crime in a manner that would remove them from 
the scope of the statute.”). 
 121 Id. at 633 & n.4.  
 122 Id. at 633 (“The Legislature, through its findings, therefore, made an 
assessment that the intentional selection of a victim based on a protected characteristic 
is tantamount to a crime motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred, thereby justifying 
enhanced punishment.”). 
 123 See Judicial Directory—Hon. Jill Konviser, N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
http://www.nycourtsystem.com/Applications/JudicialDirectory/Bio.php?ID=7030086 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
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determines that the statute is clearly worded and 
unambiguous, the court’s analysis is at an end.124 Therefore, any 
further discussion of the legislative history of the Act would not 
have been appropriate.125 In Fox, the court did take the extra step 
of offering an explanation for the inclusion of the legislative 
findings—namely, to justify enactment, communicate outrage, 
and advance its goal of deterring bias crimes.126 
Fox is the only reported case to have squarely 
considered this issue. In fact, no judge has subjected the 
statute to as searching a level of scrutiny. With respect to the 
opportunistic bias crime issue, one Family Court assumed—
without citing authority—that the legislature could not 
possibly have intended to include opportunistic bias crimes.127 
In People v. Diaz, a Supreme Court128 remarked that the 
legislative findings implicitly referenced historical injustices.129 
Another, in People v. Amadeo, averred that opportunistic bias 
crimes were “probably not even covered by the act.”130  
Amadeo is also noteworthy because the court had at its 
disposal not only the arguments of the parties, but also those of 
the Attorney General, who retains a statutory right to 
intervene where the constitutionality of a statute is in 
question.131 In its brief, the Attorney General summarily 
disposed of defendant Amadeo’s argument, sounding very much 
like the Fox defendants:  
The examples cited by the defendant, i.e. crimes against women and 
against Asian shopkeepers based on their vulnerability as victims, 
would arguably not fall within the ambit of the hate crimes statute 
  
 124 Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (“The governing rule of statutory construction is 
that courts are obliged to interpret a statute to effectuate the intent of the Legislature, 
and when the statutory ‘language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so 
as to give effect to the plain meaning of [the] words’ used.” (citing People v. Finnegan, 
647 N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 1995))). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 In re John V., 820 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 n.3 (Fam. Ct. 2006) (“No doubt, the 
Legislature did not intend the Hate Crimes Act to have such a reach—but it could.”). 
 128 In New York State, the trial-level criminal court with jurisdiction over 
felonies is somewhat confusingly called Supreme Court. 
 129 People v. Diaz, 727 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (“Implicit in the 
findings, of course, is the acknowledgment of our shared pain from past crimes 
committed against masses of peoples, groups, and individuals which unquestionably 
were meant to target certain classes of people.”). 
 130 People v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *12 & n.7 
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2001).  
 131 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1012(b) (Consol. 2010). 
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unless the proof included evidence of some group-based animus 
motivating the defendants.132 
Unlike the Fox court, the Attorney General treated the 
legislative findings in the Hate Crimes Act as a substantive 
provision, and accordingly found that the findings precluded 
application of the law to opportunistic bias crimes.133  
7. Other Jurisdictions 
Because New York enacted its hate crime statute so late 
in relation to other states, the drafters had the ability to model 
the statute based on the laws that existed in other jurisdictions. 
A survey of state hate crime laws that existed at the time New 
York’s Hate Crimes Act was under consideration shows that 
several states had clearly modeled their statutes to require that 
a defendant be motivated by hate or animus.134 Since these 
models were available to the drafters, the inference can be 
drawn that they made a deliberate decision to omit particular 
language limiting the statute to crimes motivated by hate. 
Nevertheless, an alternative explanation exists. The 
drafters of the Hate Crimes Act used as their model the 
Wisconsin statute upheld in Mitchell.135 Assuming for the 
moment that the primary concern of the drafters was to 
produce a statute that would not be struck down by a court, 
their importation of the Wisconsin statute—even including its 
ambiguities as to crimes of opportunity and crimes of hate—
makes perfect sense. In Mitchell, the Wisconsin statute 
received the U.S. Supreme Court’s imprimatur; in the roughly 
seven years following, no other potentially fatal flaws presented 
  
 132 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment 
Counts at 10, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 (No. 3523/2000). The defendant in 
Amadeo was charged with knifing a man he believed to be Mexican on a subway 
platform and, afterward, hurling ethnic slurs. Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 at 
*1-2. This conduct could not reasonably be classified as an opportunistic bias crime, but 
the defendant nonetheless made the argument—unsuccessfully—that his due process 
rights were violated by being prosecuted under a statute worded broadly enough to 
include conduct not intended by the legislature. Id. at 11-12.  
 133 Id. (“Interpreting the statute in light of these findings would require that 
the ‘belief or perception regarding’ the group to which a victim belongs . . . must include 
a bias or prejudice against that group.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 134 LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 191 (listing FLA. STAT ANN. § 775.085 (West 
1995) (“commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the 
race, color, [etc.]”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32 (1997) (“any criminal act coupled 
with overt actions motivated by bigotry and bias”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1997) 
(“because of hostility towards the victim’s religion, race, [etc.]”)). 
 135 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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themselves. Viewed this way, the drafters’ choice to forego the 
more specific language embodied in other states’ statutes 
(language that would have clarified the ambiguities discussed 
in this note), might reflect less a conscious choice as to the 
statute’s scope than the simple possibility that the legislature 
was constitutionally risk-averse.136 
8. Summary 
On balance, it is very difficult to say with certainty that 
the legislature specifically intended to enact a statute that 
folded within its scope opportunistic bias crimes. The 
statements issued by its framers, other public officials, and the 
public at large overwhelmingly suggest that pure hate was the 
intended target of the statute. Although the one case on point, 
Fox, unambiguously takes the opposite position, it does so more 
as a matter of judicial restraint in statutory interpretation. 
Other courts, as well as the Office of the Attorney General, 
appear to disagree with Fox. Finally, the fact that the 
Assembly bill was clearly written to exclude opportunistic bias 
crimes does not mean that the Senate must have intended the 
opposite, by its decision to pass a differently worded bill. Even 
if the framers of the Senate bill intended to include 
opportunistic bias crimes, there is strong evidence that most of 
the legislators who voted for it and most members of the public 
who supported it were unaware of that particular detail. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK STATUTE OUTSIDE THE 
BOUNDS OF PURE HATE CRIMES 
Use of the Hate Crimes Act in New York State got off to 
what appeared to be a problem-free start. On Sunday, October 
8, 2000, the very day the law took effect and the day before 
Yom Kippur, three Yonkers men fire-bombed a synagogue in 
  
 136 The Wisconsin statute, as amended in 1992, read in pertinent part:  
intentionally selects the person against whom the crime . . . is committed or 
selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime . . . in 
whole or in part because of the actor’s belief or perception regarding the race, 
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of 
that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether of not the 
actor’s belief or perception was correct. 
Act of Apr. 30, 1992, 1991 Wis. Sess. Laws 291. 
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the Riverdale section of the Bronx.137 The men, all Arab-
American, told police they wanted to make a statement against 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.138 In large part, 
it appeared to be just the sort of crime that the Hate Crimes 
Act of 2000 was intended to punish.139 
Nevertheless, not every crime in which section 485 was 
used over the next nine years fit as conveniently into the 
intended applications as did the firebombing attack. Two 
similar incidents in which prosecutors drew diametrically 
opposed conclusions and made different charging decisions are 
illustrative of the degree to which the Hate Crimes Act is open 
to interpretation. In 2004, a Queens special education teacher 
was charged under the statute with scrawling the words 
“nigger,” “fuck,” and “pussi” on the wall of a school restroom.140 
The trial judge ruled that the charge could stand even though 
the graffiti did not appear to be directed at any specific 
victim.141 That same year, two Staten Island teens were 
arrested for pouring gasoline in the shape of a massive 
swastika in an intersection, then setting it ablaze.142 The 
district attorney declined to bring hate crime charges, 
explaining that those charges were not appropriate where a 
particular victim could not be discerned.143 It is difficult to see 
much significant difference between the two crimes on the issue 
of whether a specific victim could be discerned; nonetheless, two 
district attorneys made entirely opposite charging decisions. 
  
 137 Elissa Gootman, Hate-Crime Charges Filed in Vandalism of Synagogue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at B3. A fourth man was also arrested but not charged and 
released pending further investigation. Id. 
 138 People v. Assi, 877 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d 928 N.E. 2d. 
388 (N.Y. 2010). 
 139 See supra Part II.B regarding the intent of the statute. 
 140 People v. Moorjaney, No. 2098/04, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 791, at *1 (Sup. 
Ct. Mar. 24, 2006). Media accounts differ in the exact phrase scrawled, reporting it as 
“nigger die.” See, e.g., Celeste Katz & Austin Fenner, Nab Teacher in Hate-Graffiti 
Attack, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 13, 2004, at 2. 
 141 Moorjaney, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 791, at *4 (“[T]here was sufficient 
evidence for the Grand Jury to conclude that the writer of the offensive words was 
motivated by a perception of the person or persons who used the third floor female 
bathroom; that would include, among others, all the people in the school, all the female 
people in the school, [and] all the black female people . . . .”). 
 142 Ikimulisa Livingston, S.I. Swasti-Punks Duck ‘Hate’ Rap, N.Y. POST, July 
9, 2004, at 19. 
 143 Id. (“‘Though the burning of the swastika was ‘insensitive, disgusting and 
offensive to any sensible person,’ in this case it didn’t justify hate-crime charges 
because it wasn’t aimed at any particular person or group,’ said Staten Island DA 
Daniel Donovan. ‘The hate-crime statute as written by state legislators does not 
support the filing of hate crime charges in this case,’ Donovan said.”). 
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While cases such as the two outlined above underscore 
the difficulty of applying the statute in a uniform fashion, it 
was another 2004 Queens case that shows just how far the 
envelope might be pushed in construing “hate.” Shirley Miller, 
an alleged scam artist accused of fleecing four older, lonely men 
out of hundreds of thousands of dollars by pretending to be 
their sweetheart, found herself charged not simply with grand 
larceny144—but grand larceny as a hate crime.145 Miller pleaded 
guilty mid-trial in exchange for a four-month sentence.146 
The Miller case is indicative of the particular 
susceptibility of the “age” category in the Hate Crimes Act to the 
prosecution of opportunistic hate crimes. Armed with this 
powerful tool to enhance criminal penalties, prosecutors have 
applied it zealously to cases where the facts fit the language of 
the statute. Prosecutors in at least two boroughs of New York 
City have obtained indictments on hate crime charges in violent 
muggings of elderly victims, where there is some evidence that 
the perpetrator targeted the elderly so as to minimize the 
possibility of resistance.147 In Queens, District Attorney Richard 
Brown prosecuted several more female grifters like Miller, each 
time charging larceny as a hate crime.148  
Nevertheless, application of the Hate Crimes Act to 
opportunistic bias crimes has not been limited to elderly 
victims. In Queens, District Attorney Brown—apparently 
  
 144 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.40 (McKinney 2011). 
 145 Scott Shifrel, Call Elderly Scam a Qns. Hate Crime, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), 
Oct. 9, 2004, at 14 (calling the tactic “a novel strategy” and quoting Queens DA Richard 
Brown as saying, “Such crimes of financial exploitation are commonly known as 
‘sweetheart scams’ and are among the most devastating forms of elder abuse.”). 
 146 Gersh Kuntzman, ‘Golden Oldie’ Bilk Gal: I Did It, N.Y. POST, Oct. 15, 
2005, at 5. Miller could have faced a maximum sentence of up to twenty-five years in 
prison. See Shifrel, supra note 145. 
 147 See, e.g., Ikimulisa Livingston, 800G Rip-off of 93-yr.-old Is a Hate Crime, 
N.Y. POST, Feb. 28, 2008, at 23 (Queens); Man Is Charged with Hate Crimes in Attacks 
on 2 Elderly Women, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007 (Queens); Melissa Grace et al., Thug 
Chokes on His Tears; Granny-Bashing Ex-Con Says He Preyed on B’klyn Elderly to 
Feed Crack Addiction, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 22, 2008, at 2; Webcrims Case Details 
(on file with author) (Brooklyn). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in a similar 
Manhattan case, the New York County District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, did not 
seek hate crime charges. Melissa Grace, Mugger of Elderly a Serial Thug, DAILY NEWS 
(N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2009, at 29. 
 148 Ikimulisa Livingston, Teen Charged with $1M Love Scam, N.Y. POST, Oct. 
6, 2006, at 27; Warren Woodbury, Jr. & Scott Shifrel, Lost Love and Out 300Gs; Nab 
Woman in Grift Scam, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 7, 2005, at 8. In at least one other 
Queens case, hate crime charges were applied to a scammer who, rather than preying 
upon loneliness, preyed upon the perceived gullibility of the elderly, disguising himself 
as a water man to gain entry to victims’ homes, then stealing their valuables. John 
Sullivan, Imposter Sentenced for Burglaries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at B4. 
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among the most aggressive law enforcement officials when it 
comes to section 485—charged the members of an alleged auto 
insurance fraud ring under the statute, arguing that the 
defendants targeted Asian-Americans in the Flushing section 
of the borough.149 The district attorney’s theory was that the 
defendants “created” phony accidents by deliberately colliding 
with Asian drivers, selecting them based on the belief that the 
language barrier made them easy targets and “that they were 
bad drivers and that they would be blamed by police and 
insurers for the accidents, instead of the culprits.”150 
It was against this backdrop of inconsistent, and to 
some degree experimental charging under the Hate Crimes 
Act, that the attempted robbery of Michael Sandy took place. 
The Kings County District Attorney, Charles Hynes—himself 
the special prosecutor in a noted pre-Hate-Crimes-Act case of 
racial animus151—characterized his office’s approach in the 
Sandy case as pioneering. In a press release issued to announce 
the indictment of the three Fox defendants, Hynes suggested 
that his office’s use of the hate crime law in the case was 
nontraditional.152 In interviews, officials in Hynes’ office told 
  
 149 Maria Alvarez, DA: Scammers Targeted Asians, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 31, 
2008, at A52. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Hynes was the special prosecutor in the 1987 trial of a group of white men 
who chased a black man to his death on a highway in the Howard Beach section of 
Queens. Biography of Charles J. Hynes, KINGS CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
http://www.brooklynda.org/hynes/da_corner.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011); Denis 
Hamill, Hell Night That Changed N.Y.C.: Atty’s on Both Sides Go Back Down Mean 
Streets. Howard Beach 20 Years Later, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 17, 2006, at 22. 
 152 Press Release, Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Office, Kings County District 
Attorney Charles J. Hynes Announces Indictments in Bias Murder: Plans to Apply Little-
Used Section of Hate Crime Statute (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://www.brooklynda.org/ 
News/press_releases_2006.htm#056. The DA’s release, in fact, misstates the prosecutorial 
approach by suggesting that some “little-used” section of the statute made the charge 
possible in the case:  
Typically, according to state law, Hate Crimes are charged when prosecutors 
believe the defendants acted out of bias against the victims’ race, color, 
national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or 
sexual orientation. But the less used section of the law calls for Hate Crimes 
to be charged when the defendant intentionally selects the person against 
whom the offense is committed or intended to be committed based on a belief 
about those same factors. 
Id. 
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news reporters that the approach was novel153 and the news 
media portrayed it as such.154 
Even defendant Fortunato’s unexpected trial gambit of 
proving his own homosexuality by calling as witnesses three 
sexual partners failed, in the end, to make a difference.155 
Fortunato was convicted of second-degree manslaughter as a 
hate crime.156 Nevertheless, in interviews with newspapers that 
covered the trial, jurors said they obeyed the law as it was 
explained to them—but disagreed with it.157 
Since Fox, there have been a few other incidents of 
relevance. In Suffolk County, Long Island, a Hispanic man was 
charged under the hate crime statute for sending threatening 
notes and hurling a log and a glass bottle at worshippers at a 
church he once attended.158 The offender, Christhian Mungia 
Garcia, allegedly told investigators he was angry at the church 
for aggressively pressuring its congregation for donations.159 
This particular fact pattern is likely quite unique, and—strictly 
speaking—falls outside our discussion of opportunistic bias 
crimes. This defendant’s motivation was not a belief that his 
victim would make an easy, convenient, or resistance-free 
target. However, the district attorney’s decision to pursue hate 
crime charges reflect a strained reading of the statute. The 
crime differed in a meaningful way from more prototypical acts 
  
 153 The author, who was a news reporter at the time of the case, had 
conversations with members of Hynes’s office to this effect. The source of these 
conversations is confidential. 
 154 Ginsberg & Celona, supra note 6; Clyde Haberman, An Easy Target, but 
Does that Mean Hatred?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at B1; Bart Jones, Murder 
Charges in Sandy Case; Using an Obscure Statute, Prosecutors Will Seek Murder as a 
Hate Crime Charges on 3 Suspects, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 26, 2006, at A16. 
 155 Marzulli, supra note 13. 
 156 Inmate Information, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVS., http:// 
nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 157 Michael Brick, To the Jury’s Regret, a Hate Crime Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2007, at B2 (Quoting a juror as saying, “By the letter of the law, Fortunato was 
guilty, but none of us thought that he had any hatred or animosity toward 
homosexuals,” and adding that the statute was “perhaps too broad.”); John Marzulli & 
Scott Shifrel, 2nd Suspect Convicted in Gay Hate Slay, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 12, 
2007, at 18 (Quoting jury foreman Eric Zaccar as saying, “I still don’t believe it’s a hate 
crime but by the technicality of this ridiculous law . . . . It’s a good law when it applies 
to fat white guys with baseball bats beating up a black man. But when it applies to one 
gay person seeking out another gay person, it’s absurd.”). 
 158 Matthew Chayes & Elizabeth Moore, Cops: It Wasn’t Racial Bias; Charged 
with Bias Crime Against Religious Practice; Suspect Was Upset He Was Rebuffed by 
Church, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 6, 2009, at A14. 
 159 Id. (quoting the defendant as saying, in his statement to police, “I hate the 
church . . . I want everyone to know that the church is only after their money and that 
they should all leave the church and just read the Bible.”). 
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of religious vandalism, where the perpetrator’s “hate” is based 
purely on the religious identity of the members, rather than, as 
here, a specific policy, position, or activity of the particular 
religious institution. The soliciting of donations is a widespread 
practice among religious institutions; to use it as the basis for a 
hate crime charge is nearly as counterintuitive as charging a 
hate crime in a hypothetical case where a perpetrator eggs a 
church to communicate his disapproval of bingo night. 
The other incident of relevance to this discussion 
provides an example of the reverse phenomenon seen in the 
church-harassment case and Fox—that of a district attorney 
choosing not to bring hate crime charges where, at least by the 
standards of other district attorneys, such charges would be 
appropriate. On Sept. 2, 2006, Ricardo Salinas, a Mexican-born 
cook at a Staten Island restaurant, was beaten and robbed by a 
trio of teens.160 Salinas succumbed to a heart attack after the 
assault.161 At arraignment, prosecutors, relying on statements 
made by one defendant, John Messiha, said that another 
defendant, Travis King, had suggested to Messiha and 
codefendant Daniel Betancourt that they rob a Mexican.162 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not seek, nor did the grand 
jury hand up, hate crime charges against the defendants.163 A 
spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office explained that the 
office exercised discretion in not applying the hate crime 
statute: “We saw it as a crime of opportunity, not a crime of 
hate. If they saw another guy walking down the street with $20 
in his hand, they might have robbed him first.”164 
  
 160 Mike Jaccarino & Ernie Naspretto, Murdered for $60; Wife Hears His Cries 
for Help as Murdered S.I. Man Calls Home, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 4, 2006, at 7. 
 161 Peter Kadusin & Leo Standora, 3 Aimed to Rob a Mexican: DA, DAILY 
NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 6, 2006, at 8. 
 162 Id. (quoting Assistant District Attorney Alex Schapiro as saying, “The 
defendants were playing video games and decided to rob somebody. They wanted it to 
be a Mexican man and that’s when they went out and found Mr. Salinas.”); Criminal 
Complaint at 2, People v. Betancourt, No. 2006RI007455 (Richmond Cnty. Crim. Ct. 
Sept. 4, 2006) (attributing to defendant Messiha the statement, “Travis said we should 
rob a Mexican. We were walking down Van Pelt [Avenue] and saw a Mexican. Travis 
said to get him . . . .”). 
 163 Robert F. Moore, DA: A Crime of Greed, Not Hate, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 
12, 2006, at 36 (quoting the DA, “[I]t is clear that the motivation for the attack on Mr. 
Salinas was robbery, not ethnicity.”). The Daily News article incorrectly asserts that 
prosecutors no longer believed King made the statement about robbing a Mexican. In 
fact, this remained evidence in the case up to and including trial. Interview with 
William Smith, Dir. of Pub. Info., Richmond Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, in Brooklyn, 
N.Y. (Oct. 19, 2009). 
 164 Interview with William Smith, supra note 163. 
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It is hard to find meaningful differences between Fox 
and the Betancourt, King, and Messiha case. In both cases, 
teenage perpetrators looking primarily for money decided to 
rob someone. In both cases, the defendants decided to rob a 
member of a particular group. In Fox, that plan stemmed from 
a belief that a gay man would be an easier target, one less 
likely to resist or report the crime. In the Staten Island case, 
the exact motive for robbing a Mexican remains shrouded in 
some uncertainty. Nevertheless, the district attorney’s facile 
explanation that the motive remained “robbery, not ethnicity,” 
does nothing to close the issue. Defendants could not plausibly 
have targeted a Mexican victim without at least some reason. If 
that reason was pure hate, the decision not to apply the statute 
is inexplicable. But even if that reason turned out to have been 
the belief that Mexicans—especially illegal laborers—carry 
cash, then the case fits squarely within the Fox mold. In that 
case, the decision not to charge can only be explained by the 
District Attorney’s Office’s apparent rejection of the 
applicability of the hate crime statute to opportunistic bias 
crimes. 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF POORLY DRAFTED STATUTES 
AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
That two district attorneys should reach opposite 
determinations on cases so similar, and which took place 
within five weeks of each other in the same year, indicates the 
problems created by the Hate Crimes Act of 2000. The law’s 
failure to clearly include or clearly exclude opportunistic bias 
crimes has invited prosecutors to fill in the statute’s black holes 
by exercising their own discretion. It is axiomatic that 
prosecutors enjoy unreviewable discretion over decisions 
whether to charge, and what charges to bring.165 However, that 
discretion serves the public best when it is exercised in the 
  
 165 See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“Judges are not 
free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials our ‘personal and 
private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial 
function.’” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952))); People v. DiFalco, 
377 N.E.2d 732, 735, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 486 (1978) (“The District Attorney has broad 
discretion in determining when and in what manner to prosecute a suspected offender.” 
(citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783)); Nieblas v. Kings County Dist. Attorney, 619 N.Y.S.2d 
703, 703 (App. Div. 1994) (“It is well-settled that the decision whether to prosecute is 
entrusted to the sole discretion of the District Attorney.”); People v. Harding, 355 
N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (App. Div. 1974) (referencing the “recognizedly unfettered discretion 
of the District Attorney to prosecute or not to prosecute.”). 
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context of a particular case presenting extraordinary 
circumstances. It does not serve the public when that discretion 
is exercised over so major a concern as determining the proper 
scope of an important legislative act. However, this note does 
not argue for a limitation of this discretion. Rather, it argues 
that the legislature is ultimately responsible for directing this 
discretion through carefully worded statutes. 
The questions of whether opportunistic bias crimes 
should be punished as harshly as crimes of true hate is beyond 
the scope of this note. It is sufficient to note that colorable 
arguments exist on both sides. On the one hand, the belief or 
perception that certain groups make better crime targets can be 
as pernicious and destructive as the belief that those individuals 
are persons of lesser worth.166 In fact, such a belief can be more 
harmful, because it provides a practical encouragement to 
commit a crime against those persons. However, it should be 
remembered that hate crime laws are not concerned with beliefs 
per se, but rather concrete acts committed in connection with 
beliefs.167 A crime committed for a practical reason—however 
misinformed, prejudicial, or irrational that reason—tends not to 
generate the same level of revulsion as a crime committed out of 
pure hate, according to many commentators.168 
In any event, the answer to the question is less 
important than the basic imperative that the answer be clear 
to law enforcement and the citizenry. What those on either side 
of the crimes-of-opportunity/crimes-of-hate debate should find 
patently unacceptable is the possibility that the legislature 
failed to translate its intent accurately into law. In Fox, 
prosecutors appeared to take just the opposite position—that 
the legislature might enact a statute to prohibit a particular 
species of conduct, but that by its plain language, that statute 
  
 166 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Hate Crime 
Counts by the People of the State of New York at 12-14, People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 
627 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (No. 8607/06) (citing Wang, supra note 16). Wang argues that hate 
crime participants, dating back to Jim Crow-era lynch mobs, commit the offenses for a 
variety of reasons other than simply hate, notably social acceptance and the knowledge 
that the crime may be tolerated by authority. Wang, supra note 16, at 1413 (“Those 
who insist on the pure ‘animus’ model also miss the complexity and range of 
perpetrators’ motivations for committing even ‘prototypical’ bias crimes.”). 
 167 See supra Part I.C. 
 168 See, e.g., LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 79 (“The central point here is that 
as we punish bias crimes, we must understand precisely what we are punishing: 
purposeful or knowing, conscious criminal conduct grounded in racial animus.”). 
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might properly be used to prohibit another related, but distinct, 
species of conduct.169 That conclusion is troubling. 
The research incorporated into this note raises 
significant doubts about whether the legislature specifically 
intended to proscribe crimes of opportunity under the Hate 
Crimes Act of 2000. It shows that, at best, the legislature was 
simply unaware of the crimes-of-opportunity/crimes-of-hate 
distinction and never squarely addressed the issue. To be sure, 
evidence exists, most notably, the existence of the Assembly 
version of the bill, to suggest that the law was drafted 
purposefully to sweep in those crimes of opportunity. But the 
near absence of any mention of the issue in public discourse, 
legislative documents, or floor debate suggests that even if this 
were true, the vast majority of voting legislators perceived the 
issue in broader strokes.170 
Whether the legislative misfire discussed here rises to 
the level of a major problem in construction of our criminal law 
depends upon one’s perspective. The fact that some 
opportunistic bias crimes may be punished as severely as pure 
hate crimes is unlikely to stir much sympathy in the average 
observer. First, the issue is limited, by definition, to a 
particular subset of an already-rare breed of crime. Second, and 
more importantly, any person prejudiced by this issue will 
necessarily be a person not simply accused of a crime, but 
already convicted of a crime, who now argues that he should 
not additionally have been convicted of a hate crime. Put 
differently, this is not a problem that can befall the average, 
law-abiding, responsible citizen. It is a problem that can only 
afflict a criminal. For that reason alone, it is unlikely to be 
considered a major injustice. 
Given these realities, the prospects for seeing the statute 
applied only as envisioned by its drafters are dim. The cases 
discussed herein show that, while some district attorneys will 
exercise restraint in applying the statute, some will instead 
  
 169 Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 18, Fox, 844 
N.Y.S.2d 627 (“[A] general law may, and frequently does, originate in some particular 
case or class of cases which is in the mind of the legislature at the time, but, so long as 
it is expressed in general language, the courts cannot, in the absence of express 
restrictions, limit its application to those cases, but must apply it to all cases that come 
within its terms and its general purpose and policy.” (quoting Jensen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
82 N.Y.2d 77, 86 (1993))). 
 170 See N.Y. STAT. § 74 (McKinney 2011) (“A court cannot by implication supply 
in a statute a provision which it is reasonable to suppose the Legislature intended 
intentionally to omit; and the failure of the Legislature to include a matter within the 
scope of an act may be construed as an indication that its exclusion was intended.”). 
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choose not only to apply it as written, but also to find novel and 
innovative ways to do so. Significantly, those who do not exercise 
restraint will find few checks—short of that exercised by the 
voter—on their decision. As seen in Fox, courts will not—and 
should not—step in absent a clear indication that a district 
attorney is actually violating the language of a statute.171  
The problem is not one with an easy solution. Given the 
well-established discretion accorded prosecutors, a district 
attorney may apply a statute like the Hate Crimes Act as 
written; Fox demonstrated that a court will not force a 
prosecutor to engage in a searching review of the legislative 
history when a statute’s plain meaning is evident. Instead, the 
legislature—having created the problem—is the only body that 
can correct it. Sadly, it is a body unequal to the task. Even in a 
well-functioning, productive legislature, an elected official 
arguably gains no political advantage by amending the statute 
in this fashion. In a legislature such as New York’s, where 
political infighting,172 corruption,173 and deal making174 are the 
norm, the prospects are even grimmer. Accordingly, unless 
there is an astounding and unexpected surge in political 
courage in Albany, the flawed statute—one that casts a wider 
net than its authors intended—will remain the law. 
Alex Ginsberg† 
  
 171 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 172 Editorial, Still Broken After All These Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at A24. 
 173 Tom Precious, Bruno Convicted on 2 of 8 Fraud Counts; Ex-Majority 
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Senator, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 8, 2009, at A1. 
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